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 Introduction 
In the paper, we offer a simple welfare analysis of the likely consequences of the recent trade 
reforms and policies in an attempt to rationalize the strat egic behavior of major peanut exporting 
and importing countries in the framework of  imperfectly competitive markets with the focus on 
the global and inter-American peanut trade. This study is motivated by the fact that, while the 
trend towards liberalization of agricultural trade  is supposed to be welfare e nhancing, liberalizing 
imperfectly competitive and often distorted markets can increase the incentives of the trade 
participants to overuse the  still available  trade policies. At the same time, certain distortionary 
trade policies can be  welfare enhancing in imperfectly competitive markets by correcting for the 
history of suboptimal production and strategic interactions.  
  While complicated nature of pea nut trade policies prevents exact  modeling, outlining a 
few notable features help correc tly choose among more general trade models that can be  used in 
the analysis. While most of the world peanut  production is consumed domestically, a few 
countries do export a sizeable share of their production. Production for export is concentrated 
mainly in South-East Asia (China, India, and Vietnam) and South  America (Argentina and 
Mexico). Generally, the exporters enjoy both cost  and comparative advantage in peanut 
production. The main importers of edible peanuts are the EU, Japan, the U.S., and Canada. The 
U.S. is probably the only country tha t both exports and imports peanuts, most likely due to their 
differentiated nature. 
  The main trend among peanut importers has been that of lowering import tariffs and 
duties under the WTO rules. Besides, peanut tariffs within the NAFTA and FTA A are even 
lower and member countries enjoy preferent ial treatment by the U.S., the main American 
importer.    2 
  As for production subsidies, only the U.S. has been consistently supporting its peanut 
production via the supply management policies and later by the Market ing Loan Program. While 
these supports do not exac tly qualify as production (or export) subsidies, the marketing loan 
program (and counter-cyclical payments) effectively subsidizes production when the prices  are 
low. Production supports are  increasingly limited by the multi-lateral WTO agreements on 
agricultural policies, so that it is safe to assume that ther e is a trend towards lowering production 
supports. Little is known about agricultural support policies i n China, but there are reasons to 
believe that its government c an subsidize production for strategic reasons. The rest of peanut 
exporters do not offer any significant production or export supports.   
  An important peculiarity of the peanut (and other agricultural) trade reforms is that they 
are taking place in largely imperfectly competitive markets that have been distorted by 
protectionist trade policies. Imperfect competition is likely to exist on both the national level in 
many countries with concentrate d processing and exporting industries, and on supra -national 
level, whereby governments engage in strategic trade policies.  
  In analyzing the world peanut trade, we distinguish competition by exporters for an 
import market (the U.S. and the South American peanut producers compete with the Asian 
producers and each other for the EU and other  import markets) and competition among 
producers that trade  with each other, exemplifying the inter-American peanut trade as a sub -
sector because peanuts are produced in the South and North America and because the NAFTA 
and FTAA countries enjoy preferential trea tment within the region. For analyzing competition 
for exports, we use the Brander -Spencer model of Cournot -Nash equilibrium with optimal 
subsidies (Brander and Spencer, 1985).  For analyzing regional intra-industry trade, we employ a 
model of segmented markets with free entry described in Dixit (1984).  Overall, our findings are   3 
consistent with the basic conclusions of the trade t heory that liberalizing imperfectly competitive 
markets has ambiguous effects and is not necessarily w elfare improving. 
   
 
Brief Overview of World Peanut Producti on and Trade   
The world peanut production has been increasing since the 1970s, mostly due to increa sing 
yields and increased demand for peanut  food products. The leading world peanut producers in 
2001-3 were China (45% of the  world production), India (19%), followed by the US (5.2%), 
Nigeria (4.7%), and Indonesia (3.3% ). The main world peanut producing regions can be divided 
into the Americas, Africa, and Asia, (Revoredo and Fletcher, 2003 a). Within the Americas, the 
North American production has increased by about 14% , while production in the South America 
has decreased by 24.1% , mostly in Brazil ( Lee, Kennedy, and Fletcher , 2005). In Africa, 
production increased tre mendously in the western region (Chad and Nigeria), while Eastern and 
South African production fell. Most of the growth in the world production occurred in Asia 
(163% since 1972-1975), mainly due to Chinese production increase of  563%, reaching 14.6 mil 
tons in 2001-2004.  
  Peanut consumption is almost evenly divided between edible purposes (42.3% in 2001 -
2004) and crushing for meal and oil (48.6%). Peanuts represent about 10% of world production 
of oilseeds (after soybeans, cottonseed, and rap eseed). North American consumption has 
increased by 52% mainly due to edible uses, while the South American consumption declined 
(though edible use increased), making  the export market more important for the  South American 
producers.    4 
  The world peanut trade can be considered a residual market, as most of the production is 
consumed domestically. Average share of exports in the  total world production has been about 
5% since the 1970s, while the total volume has been growing from 1.1 to 1.8 mil m etric tons. 
Most of the U.S. production is consumed domest ically – only 6% of the domestic production was 
exported in 2001-3.  
  The world’s major peanut exporters are China (49% of global exports in 2001 -3), the 
U.S., Argentina (13%), India (7%), Vietnam (5%). The major peanut  importers are the EU 
(38%), Japan (8.5%), Indonesia (7.6%), Russia (7.4%), Canada (7%), Mexico (6.6%), and the 
US (4.9%). Of these, only the US appears to be both importing and exporting peanuts in 
significant  volumes.  
  Peanuts are more differentiated than sta ple crops like soybeans, corn, or wheat, as they 
differ not only by grades, but also in  quality (particularly aflatoxin content). This differentiation 
is reflected by price differences acc ording to the country of origin (Revoredo and Fletcher, 
2003b). 
  The trend among the importers in t he EU and the South-East Asia has been to lower or 
eliminate import duties and ( in-quota) tariffs. The U.S. replaced import quotas with tariff rate 
quotas with 9.35c/kg for in -shell and 6.6c/kg for shelled in -quota rates, the over-quota tariffs 
being prohibitively expensive. The major exporters of peanuts to t he U.S. in 2003 were 
Argentina, Mexico, and China. However, these countries have n ot been treated equally (see 
below).  
   
2. Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Discussion of Th eir Applicability to 
the World Peanut Trade.   5 
In this section, we consider two distinct classes of models of trade with imperfect competition. 
One is the Brander-Spencer (1985) type of models that assume countries producing for exports 
only and competing in an import ma rket. The other class of models consider s bilateral trade 
flows between countries that both consume and trade their produce with each other. As argued 
above, the first class of models applies to the case of major peanut exporters competing for the 
import market (mainly the E U and the U.S.), while the second corresponds to the bilateral inter-
American trade (US - South America). Due to size limitations, the model presentation s have 
been shrunk.  
 
2.1. Countries producing for exports only  
  2.1.1. Cournot competition. 
The conventional models show that export subsidies (or production subsidies in the absence of 
domestic consumption) benefit the subsidizing country’s industry, and there fore reciprocal 
subsidies result when there are several count ries producing only for export. It is important that 
this logic does not require specific assumptions about the cost function, the  only assumptions 
being behavioral. 
  In its simplest form, the Brander-Spencer (1985) model is as follows. Assuming two 
countries producing a certain homogeneous good for export in a third country , a Nash-Cournot 
equilibrium in the absence of government intervention is defined by the intersection of the t wo 
curves defined by point C in the  figure below:   6 
 
 While the logic of the Cournot e quilibrium has been the subject of much controversy (t he 
“dynamic” adjustment ar gument being intuitively appealing but contrad icting the one-shot nature 
of the game), empirical research shows that it is a robust concept nevertheless  (Dixit, 1986).  
  An optimal per unit export/production subsidy s decreases the domestic per unit costs 
shifting the domestic reaction function to the right  to the point where home iso-profit curve is 
tangent to the foreign reaction curve (point S, a Stackelberg outcome for the home country ). The 
home profits rise to 㰀 s, while foreign profits fall. Thus, the home country benefits from the 
subsidy by shifting profits away from the foreign country, which is worse  off due to the fact that 
outputs of the two countries are strategic substitutes. Normally, the cost of the subsidy is more 
than offset by the gain in profits  and the subsidy expands domestic output more than it contracts 
the foreign production, which benefits th e importing country through an improvement in the 
terms of trade. The joint welfare of the export ers is inferior t o the no-subsidy case. However, in 
presence of a significant competitive fringe, the change in the terms of trade becomes less 



















S   7 
symmetric two-country model, the optimal policy is a subsidy, no intervention, or export tax if 
the demand is elastic, unit elastic, or inelastic. In a simultaneous -move Nash game with 
asymmetric costs and elastic demand, the high -cost country subsidizes its production at a lower 
rate than the low-cost country. 
  In the case of many firms producing a given product, the model does not change 
significantly (Dixit, 1986). An important fea ture of the multi-firm model above is that it is  more 
likely that a subsidy is larger in a country with fe wer but larger firms. 
Applying this logic to peanut production  for export, one can argue that, in order to 
increase their market share a nd apart from domestic consumption considerations, major exporters 
with both cost and comparative advantages have an  incentive to subsidize their production as it 
increases their profits allowing them to make more of the cost advantage. While the demand in 
the major importing countries is not always elastic (according to most recent estimates in 
Beghin, and Matthey, 2003), the  aggregate import demand elasticity is likely to be greater t han 
one, which leads to bilateral subsidizing of domestic exp orts. It is possible that further reductions 
in tariffs and quotas will make demand even more elastic and thus increase the low -cost producer 
incentives to subsidize even further.   
While the strategic subsidy argument may not hold for poor countries, the  largely 
centrally planned economies  with small production costs, most notab ly China, may indeed stand 
to benefit from subsidizing their export production, which permits taking more advantage of the ir 
lower costs, thus hurting other exporters but benefiting the consumers. On the one hand, the 
Chinese gradual transition to a market  economy has been marked by a rather sharp reduction in 
the state support of agriculture, which caused its temporary decline (Rozelle and Swi nnen, 2004). 
On the other, the government there is still in a position to redistribute national income among   8 
production sectors using various means that may not be easily detectable ( Diop, Beghin, and 
Sewadeh, 2004). China’s 49% share in the global peanut exports makes this strategic 
consideration important.  
  Overall, models of for-export production with Cournot -Nash behavior suggest that 
countries with smaller production costs, larger  export shares, and more concentrated production 
have more incentives to subsidize their exports. As a rule, export su bsidies benefit the importers 
but hurt the exporters through the terms-of-trade effect. 
   
  2.1.2. Bertrand competition 
  If the home and foreign countries produce differentiate d products, they might just as well 
be engaged in Bertrand competition, choosing prices instead of quantities (Eaton and Grossman, 
1986). The general result of the Bert rand model is that the home government can increase its 
industry’s profits by committing to an export  tax due to  strategic complementarity.  
  Whether Cournot or Bertrand competition is a more realistic assumption depends on a 
number of factors. Whether the  exporting countries/firms set prices rather than choose 
production quantities depends on the  actual price discovery mechanism: acceptable bargaining 
strategies, how long the prices are negotiated, sellers’ asking prices,  etc. However, the Bertrand 
competition has usually been considered more anti -competitive.  
 
2.2 Trade with Domestic Consumption  
  This setup corresponds to regional trade patterns, such as tra de between the North and 
South Americas within t he NAFTA (FTAA). The most elementary case of oligopoly models that 
accommodate consumption as well as production is a model of segmented markets described in   9 
Dixit (1984). The model assumes two countries, domestic and foreign , homogeneous products, 
constant marginal costs, and  linear demands. The available trade policies considered are:  
-  a tariff t imposed by the home country on the fo reign imports; 
-  a domestic subsidy  sq on home sales to domestic firms;  
-  an export subsidy sq
* by the foreign country to its firms.  
  Dixit’s analysis  suggests that, just like in the case of two firms competing for exports to a 
third (importing) country, a unilateral subsidy on home sales  raises the domestic and total 
output and lowers the foreign output. A  unilateral tariff raises home output and lowers the 
foreign and total output. Finally, an  export subsidy by the foreign government lowers home 
output and raises the foreign and total outputs. The welfare implication of this is  that a net effect 
of home sales subsidy is an increase in supply which lowers the price  and thus increases the 
domestic consumer surplus.  The effect on home profits is ambiguous (as output rises but the 
price falls), but the a ggregate welfare is positive. This effect  is identical to the model of 
exclusively export production with multiple f irms.  
  The domestic pr ofit maximizing tariff is positive, zero, or negative if the number of home 
firms is smaller, equal to, or larger than the n umber of foreign firms plus one. That is, the t ariff 
sign and magnitude varies with the level of home oligopo ly: the more concentrated the domestic 
industry, the higher the profit maximizing tariff. The tariff’s impact on welfare  is ambiguous, as 
it also reduces the consumer surplus, and the tariff revenue normally rises for low initial values 
but decreases thereafter. The foreign export subsidy raises total domestic consumption and 
imports but lowers domestic production, thus increasing the consumer surplus but cutting the 
domestic profits.   10 
  When both production subsidy and tariff are available as policy instrume nts and the 
demand is linear, it is optimal to subsidize domestic production and not to import when the  home 
costs are lower. There is no need for the  tariff, as the optimal home production subsidy equates 
price to the (lower) home costs and thus ousts the  imports. When the foreign country has a cost 
advantage, it is still optimal to subsidize and also to impose a positive tariff in order to increase 
revenue and offset the loss in profits. The net effect of the subsidy and tariff on welfare of the 
higher cost firm is positive.  
  These results suggest that, when both tariffs and subsidies are available to the 
governments as trade instruments, both  importing and exporting countries within a trading block 
have an incentive to subsidize production for domestic consumption. Moreover, it is in the 
interest of the welfare of the country with higher costs (inevitably the importer) to  also impose a 
tariff on the (cheaper) imports.  
  When only one of the two instruments  (subsidy or tariff) is available, sub -optimal 
outcomes ensue in the sense that the y are not as welfare enhanc ing for the country administering 
them as when both instruments are available. A positive  home sales subsidy is still 
(individually) optimal regardless of the  cost asymmetry. However, when the hom e country has 
higher costs, the subsidy also substitutes for the (unavailable) tariff and  thus the equilibrium 
domestic price is in between the domestic and foreign marginal costs. When only a  tariff is 
available, it is optimal to impose it on imports if t he home country has a cost advant age, in which 
case the domestic price is above the costs but imports are still restricted. If the home country’s 
costs are higher, the magnitude of the tariff is greater than when the subsidy can be used.   
  As for the foreign subsidy, its impact on the home welfare is ambiguous, as it lowers the 
price thus increasing the consumer surplus but also reduces domestic output thus reducing the   11 
profits. However, home welfare  unambiguously rises with the foreign subsidy only when the 
share of imports is larger than the share of home firms’ production in domestic consumption, as 
it implies smaller home profit loss.   
Considering the foreign welfare, the optimal foreign export subsidy varies 
proportionately with the level of  foreign industry concentration. The effect of th e home sales 
subsidy on the foreign welfare is negative as it lowers foreign exports and expands domestic 
consumption, thus lowering the price. The effec t of the home country’s import tariff on the 
foreign country’s welfare varies proportionately with the ratio of home to foreign firms (that is, 
when the foreign industry is more concentrated, the home country’s tariff a ctually benefits it and 
vice versa). Combining it with the effects of the home tariff on t he home welfare, both countries 
can benefit from a tariff if the foreign industry is more concentrated  and the initial equilibrium is 
globally suboptimal.  
  An important general implication of these re sults is that, in markets characterized by 
already existing trade distortions, eliminating some of the trade policies that  are considered 
harmful to trade and welfare can act ually result in sub-optimal outcomes. The models discussed 
in this paper show that the e limination of tariffs may provoke excessive subsidies and, 
alternatively, elimination of subsidies may increase tariffication. Under certain conditions, even a 
unilateral tariff may be mutually welfare enhancing. Applying this lo gic to the peanut trade 
patterns within the two Americas suggests that the South American peanut producers stand to 
benefit from the reduct ions in the U.S. peanut production supports but, paradoxically, 
preservation of a ta riff may still be mutually welfare enhancing. In the broa der context of global 
peanut trade, multi-lateral tariff reduction increases the  low-cost exporters’ incentives to 
subsidize export production.    12 
 
2.3. Product Differentiation and Monopolistic Competition  
We only briefly mention the models that accommodate product differen tiation and monopolistic 
competition. Markusen and Venables (1988) showed that product differentiation with free entry 
leads to a two-way trade. In their model, tariffs are born entirely by consumers and reduce 
domestic welfare in the consumer surplus but do not affect profits. Export subsidies by the 
foreign country benefit the foreign country and harm the ho me one. Domestic subsidy on the 
home sales improves the home country’s welfare.   
  Models of monopolistic competition in trade were developed by  Krugman (1980) and 
Helpman and Krugman (1989). In monopol istic competition, when there are a number of 
varieties and producers of each  have some monopoly power, tariffs are optimal and depend on 
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